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Abstract 
 
 
While India has generally been following an open door FDI policy, a few 
areas are still subject to caps on FDI and/or specific government approval. One of the 
justifications for the same is the need to retain a degree of control over the operations 
of the investee companies in Indian hands.  Earlier this year, the government specified 
the methodology for calculating direct and indirect foreign equity in Indian 
companies in order to remove ambiguities in calculating the extent of FDI in a 
company. Based on empirical evidence this paper argues that percentage of shares or 
proportion of directors do not necessarily represent the extent of control and more direct 
intervention would be required if the objectives of imposing the caps are to be achieved. 
 
 
 
Over the past several years, India has progressively liberalised its foreign 
direct investment (FDI) policy. As a result, in most sectors, foreign investors can  hold 
100% of the equity in firms registered in India. Restrictions that remain on foreign 
ownership are imposed in two ways: one, foreign investors are not allowed to invest 
in 11 sectors2, while some others, most of which are in the services sectors, are 
subjected to ceilings on FDI and/or specific government approval. The justification 
for the same could vary depending upon the sector but includes inter alia the desire to 
retain a certain degree of control over the operations of the investee companies in 
Indian hands and possibly to give time to the domestic entrepreneurs to gain strength 
so as to withstand competition from foreign companies4.   
The Steering Group on Foreign Direct Investment set up by the Planning 
Commission addressed the possible considerations for imposing caps and bans on FDI 
such as national security, culture and media, natural monopolies, monopoly power, 
natural resources and transition costs and recommended removal of many of the 
restrictions.5  Notable among the areas subject to caps are: defence industries, 
insurance, civil aviation, print media, broadcasting, telecom, banking and single brand 
product retail trade.6  The caps are generally placed at 26%, 49% and 74%.  In order 
to prevent breach of the ceilings by foreign investors by investing through other 
companies incorporated in India which they either “own” or “control” , the 
government has spelt out the methodology for calculating direct and indirect foreign 
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equity in Indian companies.7 This methodology has been elaborated in the 
Consolidated FDI Policy, 2010 (CFP) that became effective from April 1 2010.   
Of late, however, the government has indicated its intent to relax the caps in a 
number of sectors, including defence and retail trade.8   Earlier, discussion has also 
taken place in case of the broadcasting sector.  Also, the proposal to increase the FDI 
limit from 26% to 49% in the insurance sector is pending.  Given that the increase in 
foreign participation is now being proposed in sensitive sectors, and in reversal of the 
policies wherein the government was reluctant to cede control to foreign entities for 
fear of marginalisation of the Indian entities, it is imperative to understand the 
implications of imposing the caps on FDI.   In our view, corporate control is a 
phenomenon that seems easy to perceive, but can manifest in several different ways in 
its actualisation, which can easily cause a gap between expectations and experiences.  
This paper is an attempt to contribute to the ongoing discussion on FDI policy with 
the help of India’s recent experience with implementing the caps on FDI.   
Does Right to Appoint Majority Directors Always Imply Control? 
According to the CFP, further investments in other Indian companies by all those 
Indian companies which are owned and controlled by Indians will be treated as fully 
Indian.  For this purpose, the main criteria adopted are that (i) the Indian company should 
be majority owned by Indians10 (who should also act in concert)11 and (ii) Indians should 
have the right to appoint majority of the directors. This is irrespective of the fact that the 
investing company might be having foreign equity up to 49.99%.  On the face of it, this 
may appear to be the correct approach because a majority in equity means that nominees 
of majority equity shareholders get elected to the board who in turn would manage the 
company’s affairs according to the wishes of those who had elected them.  This has two 
dimensions: at the level of shareholders and at the board level.   
First of all, ownership of majority equity shares need not necessarily ensure 
automatic ability to get through decisions at the annual general meetings.  Special 
resolutions require a much larger percentage than a simple majority.  Secondly, 
directors are not always elected at the general meetings of shareholders.  It is only in the 
absence of special provisions majority owners can elect their nominees to all board 
positions on offer at general meetings.  Special provisions can enable certain 
shareholders, notwithstanding their share in equity, to have a minimum number of 
directors nominated to the boards.  The second is the possibility of companies issuing 
different categories of shares with differential voting rights – some even having no 
voting rights at all.12  A majority ownership of equity capital may thus not always 
automatically translate into majority voting rights and majority in the Board.13  The 
CFP does recognise this possibility of differential voting rights and special rights 
enjoyed by certain shareholders affecting decision-making (which includes election of 
directors) at annual general meetings when it states: 
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In any sector/activity, where Government approval is required for foreign 
investment and in cases where there are any inter-se agreements between/amongst 
share-holders which have an effect on the appointment of the Board of Directors 
or on the exercise of voting rights or of creating voting rights disproportionate to 
shareholding or any incidental matter thereof, such agreements will have to be 
informed to the approving authority. The approving authority will consider such 
inter-se agreements for determining ownership and control when considering the 
case for granting approval for foreign investment.  (emphasis added) 
 
The major limitation of this approach, though it is better than looking at a 
simple majority in equity shares, is that it still relies on majority in the board.  It does 
not address the second and more critical question of how a company’s board, which is 
the main operational body, functions.  Boards determine the policy, strategy and 
operational matters.  Hence in more ways than one, the board’s role is more decisive 
than that of the general body of shareholders.   
Special Provisions Could Nullify Majority in the Board 
It has been recognised for long that corporate “control is not an easy thing to 
define, and the dividing line between some control and no control is arbitrary”.14  
Legal provisions can only provide some broad parameters.  As noted above, 
ownership of majority equity is taken as a sufficient condition for unambiguous 
control because under company law most decisions taken in general meetings and 
election of directors are based on simple majority of the shares represented by those 
participating in the meeting.  However, special provisions can also bestow control of 
varying degrees even to those owning minority shares. (See Table 1 for the 
significance of different shareholding levels)  For example, a minimum of 26% would 
not only give the foreign investor greater bargaining power but under the Indian 
Company Law it would also enable the foreign shareholder to effectively oppose 
special resolutions thus limiting the freedom of the majority to carry out all their 
plans.  Further, the investors can insist on special rights which give them 
disproportionate control over another company – disproportionate both in terms of 
voting rights and board representation. This phenomenon was often seen in case of 
former FERA companies at the time of their compliance with the Act.15  For a sample 
of 56 companies, of which the prospectuses were available, it was found that  
... in 32 companies foreign partners kept control over the board of directors with a 
26 per cent or less share. In one instance, involving the cosmetics manufacturing 
company, Ponds India (...an affiliate of Cheseborough Ponds Inc of USA), the 
foreign partners could control the board by being only a member of the company, 
i.e., even by owning a solitary share of the company. (emphasis added)16 
 
If such agreements, coupled with dependence on the foreign investor for 
technology, brand names and market development (including buybacks which could 
be a very important consideration in case of the defence sector) are entered into, then 
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the control implied in the majority equity and majority in the board may have little 
relevance in practice.     
 
Table 1. Significance of Various Levels of Equity Shareholding 
 
Share in  
Equity 
(%) 
Significance/Implications 
10 Usually taken as the minimum share required to exercise control/influence.  
Identification of FDI relationship is based on this perception. Under Sections 
397 and 398 of the Indian Companies Act, 1956 those holding a minimum of 
10% share capital can approach the Company Law Board against suppression of 
minority shareholders and mismanagement. 
15 SEBI Takeover Code applies when this share is reached by the acquirer. 
20 International Accounting Standard 28 assumes that the investor exerts 
significant influence if it holds, directly or indirectly, 20 percent or more of the 
voting power at stake. 
25 Proposed by a SEBI Committee (Chairman: C. Achutan) for application of the 
Takeover Code.  Based on the shareholding pattern of listed Indian companies, 
the Committee felt that 25% is the level at which promoters would be capable of 
exercising de facto control.  Earlier, RBI classified an Indian company in which 
25% shareholding was held by a foreign company as a Foreign Controlled 
Rupee Company (FCRC). 
26 A major FDI cap. 75% being the minimum shareholding required to get special 
resolutions passed at company general meetings, those controlling 26% 
shareholding can block any special resolution, if they so desire.  According to 
companies Bill 2009, this percentage reflects “significant influence”. 
331/3  The Industrial Licensing Policy Inquiry Committee (ILPIC) defined it as 
‘effective equity’ for classifying a company into a business group (calculated 
after excluding the shares held by public financial institutions from the total) 
40 Under FERA foreign branches and subsidiaries were asked to reduce the level of 
foreign equity to 40% thereby implying companies with up to 40% foreign 
equity would be treated as domestic companies. 
49 Another important cap on FDI in certain restricted sectors.  The objective is to 
have majority shares (51%) in Indian hands. 
50.01 Simple majority.  Sufficient to get through all ordinary resolutions as also in the 
absence of proportional/cumulative voting, can elect all the directors open for 
election. 
51 Minimum government shareholding required under the Companies Act, 1956 to 
be classified as a government company 
74 This is the upper limit allowed where 100% FDI is not permitted.  This is the 
counterpart of 26%. Indian shareholders with 26% shareholding will be in a 
position, if they so desire, to block special resolutions. 
100 Wholly-owned.  
Some 
Distorting 
Factors 
(i) Special rights can change the relationship in favour of minority 
shareholders irrespective of the extent of their voting rights. 
(ii) Another manner in which the percentages can lose their significance is the 
deployment of differential voting rights. 
(iii) The situation would also be dependent upon the distribution of remaining 
shareholding.  This is more so in case of listed companies. 
 
The following cases help understand this possibility better.  Under the existing 
provisions, foreign equity is restricted to 26% in the insurance sector.  In the equity 
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share capital of Max New York Life Insurance Co Ltd (MaxLife) Max India Ltd has 
74% share and New York Life International of US (NYLI) has the remaining 26% 
stake thus conforming to the FDI cap applicable to the insurance sector.  The Articles 
of Association (AoA) of Max Life stipulate that out of the total 10 directors of the 
company, Max India is entitled to appoint 7 directors to the Max Life’s Board, NYLI 
two (non-retiring) directors and the remaining one will be filled up by the Max Life’s 
CEO.  On the face of it, Max India has far larger number of directors on MaxLife’s 
board who also constitute majority.  But when it comes to forming quorum at board 
meetings of MaxLife at least one director each nominated by Max India and NYLI 
should be present.  And for taking certain decisions by the company and any of its 
subsidiaries (each a Relevant Company),  
“... shall require prior approval by a majority of the board of directors of the 
Relevant company, which majority must include at least one (1) director appointed 
by Max India and one (1) appointed by NYLI ... (emphasis added)18 
These conditions thus nullify the majority enjoyed by Max India in the board 
of MaxLife and make NYLI an ‘equal partner’ in decision-making.  The 26% cap on 
foreign equity has thus little relevance and MaxLife effectively operates as a 50:50 
joint venture. Acquisition of additional equity by NYLI through indirect means by 
itself is not going to change the position as far as control of MaxLife is concerned.   
Similar and even more interesting case is that of Bharti Axa Life Insurance Co 
Ltd (Bharti AXA) in which AXA India Holdings, Mauritius (AXA)  has 22.222% 
stake and Bharti entities 40% and Bharti SPV (First American Securities Pvt Ltd)19 
37.778%.  In this case “(T)he quorum for the transaction of business at a General 
Meeting shall be five Members present, of whom one shall be AXA (duly 
represented) and, for so long as Bharti holds not less than 12.5% of the Shares, one 
shall be Bharti (duly represented).”20 There are similar clauses in respect of 
representation on the board as also how the shareholding of Bharti SPV should be 
transferred whenever official FDI policy is modified to allow higher foreign share.  
The AoA of the Bharti SPV states that  
... no obligation of the Company shall be entered into and no decision or 
determination shall be made and no action shall be taken by the Board with 
respect to the Company or JVCo (...) in respect of any of the matters listed in 
Article 172(3) hereof (“AXA Reserved Matters”), unless approved by a majority 
of the Directors, including the affirmative vote of the AXA Director.   
 
The forty six “AXA Reserved Matters” inter alia include:  
(pp) Any appointment, nomination and removal of any SPV Co Nominee Director 
on the board of directors of JVCo.  
(qq) Utilisation of any proceeds received by the Company from the sale / transfer 
of its shareholding in the JVCo.”21   
 
The JVCo under reference here is Bharti Axa Life Insurance Co Ltd.  Since 
AXA will decide whom to nominate to Bharti AXA’s board, it means that the 
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representatives of the SPV Co on Bharti AXA will in effect be AXA representatives.  
The 90% shares held by the Bharti entities in the SPV are thus of no consequence.  It 
is relevant to note that AXA seems to have paid heavy premium for acquiring the 
shares of the SPV while the Bharti entities obtained the shares at the face value of Rs. 
10.   Between July 5, 2006 and February 26, 2010, AXA paid Rs. 406.38 crore for 
acquiring 43,48,973 shares of Rs. 10 each at an average premium of Rs. 924.44.  On 
the other hand, Bharti entities were allotted 4,79,80,848 shares at par for Rs. 47.98 
crore. (Table 2)    
 
 
Table 2. Allotment of Shares by the First American Securities Pvt Ltd  
during July 2006 to February 2010 
 
Date of Issue Shares issued to AXA Shares issued to Bharti entities at 
par value of Rs. 10 per share 
No. At Premium 
per share of 
Rs. 
Value (Rs.) No. Value (Rs.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Jul 05 2006 20,67,778 8.812 3,88,99,040 1,86,00,000 18,60,00,000 
Aug 31 2006 0 88,50,000 8,85,00,000 
May 07 2007 1,13,334 0 11,33,340 10,20,006 1,02,00,060 
Jun 11 2007 6,12,631 0 61,26,310 55,13,690 5,51,36,900 
Sep 11 2007 5,55,240 42.63021396 2,92,22,400 49,97,152 4,99,71,520 
Nov 26 2007 66,666 5063.829958 33,82,51,948 6,00,000 60,00,000 
Feb 19 2008 66,666 3440.036450 23,00,00,130 6,00,000 60,00,000 
Mar 24 2008 66,666 3476.259667 23,24,14,987 6,00,000 60,00,000 
May 14 2008 66,666 1740.018450 11,66,66,730 6,00,000 60,00,000 
Jun 18 2008 66,666 4849.690636 32,39,76,136 6,00,000 60,00,000 
Oct 24 2008 66,666 4855.830843 32,43,85,479 6,00,000 60,00,000 
Dec 02 2008 66,666 3639.592865 24,33,03,758 6,00,000 60,00,000 
Jan 23 2009 66,666 3723.272783 24,88,82,363 6,00,000 60,00,000 
Apr 09 2009 66,666 5451.360378 36,40,87,051 6,00,000 60,00,000 
May 20 2009 66,666 1421.565160 9,54,36,723 6,00,000 60,00,000 
May 28 2009 66,666 5623.393033 37,55,55,780 6,00,000 60,00,000 
Aug 06 2009 66,666 4206.711367 28,11,11,280 6,00,000 60,00,000 
Sep 30 2009 66,666 3356.702367 22,44,44,580 6,00,000 60,00,000 
Dec 21 2009 66,666 3772.928779 25,21,92,730 6,00,000 60,00,000 
Feb 26 2010 66,666 5056.720367 33,77,77,980 6,00,000 60,00,000 
Total  43,48,973 4,06,38,68,745 4,79,80,848 47,98,08,480 
Source: Filings of the company downloaded from the Ministry of Corporate Affairs website. 
Note: Details of shares allotted by the company prior to July 05, 2006 are not available on the MCA 
website. 
 
These figures suggest that the 10% share of AXA had cost it far more than 
what the 90% acquired by Bharti in the SPV.  While on paper the combined direct and 
indirect share of AXA in the JV Co works out to 25.9998% (22.222 directly and 
37.778 x 0.10=3.7778 indirectly through the SPV) and thus conforms to the official 
FDI policy in respect of the insurance sector, the effective share of AXA works out to 
60% (22.222 directly and 37.778 through the SPV Co), far in excess of the limit 
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envisaged by the policy makers.   The emphasis on acquiring a higher share formally 
in the JV Co by AXA is further evident from the following: 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in these Articles, if and on 
each occasion that the laws or regulations of India are changed so that AXA is 
permitted to hold, directly or indirectly, more than 26% of the Shares, AXA 
shall have the right to increase its holding of Shares either by acquiring any 
or all of the Non-Disposal Shares from Bharti SPV or by subscribing for new 
Shares .... (emphasis added) 
An inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that the SPV has been created to get around 
the existing regulations and AXA was not prepared to settle for the 26% share. 
In the case of Tata-AIG General Insurance Co. Ltd also we found that the 26% 
FDI limit has no operational significance as the articles give the foreign investor 
special rights.  We did access the AoAs of Birla Sun Life Insurance Co Ltd and Bajaj 
Allianz General Insurance Co Ltd also.  However, these not being the latest, we are 
not in a position to express any opinion as far as the control mechanism written into 
the AoAs by the collaborating parties. 
It is evident that the CFP does not address the issue of functioning of the 
corporate boards in joint ventures.  As the experience of dilution of foreign equity 
under FERA suggests, use of special rights and veto powers has been a very old 
practice.  Interestingly, subsequent a news report on the special rights enjoyed by 
foreign investors in insurance joint ventures, based on our ongoing study of FDI22, in 
the context of formulating guidelines for insurance IPOs it was reported that “... no 
joint venture will be able to go public without the foreign partner losing its veto 
power in the joint venture”.23  One is not, however, clear of how such rights be treated 
in case of unlisted JVs.  Secondly, will the Indian partner be allowed to sell his entire 
stake in the open market after the company is listed and the lock-in-period, if any, is 
over leaving the foreign investor as the single largest investor in the company?  In any 
case, it is surprising why the CFP missed this important and well known aspect of 
corporate control. 
Do Veto Rights of Minority Shareholders Amount to Control? 
That the interpretation of veto rights in board meetings has become a 
contentious issue is evident from the fact that the issue is currently engaging the 
attention of the highest judicial body of the country. The case concerns the veto 
powers held by minority shareholders namely Subhkam Ventures (I) Pvt Ltd 
(Subhkam) in MSK Project (India) Ltd.  The Securities and Exchange Board of India 
(SEBI) had earlier held that since Subhkam has the right to appoint a nominee on the 
Board of MSKP and that the affirmative vote of the Subhkam’s nominee shall be 
required in dealing with a large number and variety of matters as long as Subhkam 
holds at least 10% of the share capital of MSKP, it amounts to control of Subhkam 
over MSKP.  When Subhkam went for appeal against this, the Securities Appellate 
Tribunal (SAT) observed that: 
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Since the appellant (Subhkam) has the power to nominate only one director, that 
nominee can, by no stretch of reasoning, exercise control over the affairs of the 
target company or control its board of directors. That single nominee would be in 
a microscopic minority and he has no veto powers. It is the admitted case of the 
parties that the target company is a Board managed company and the overall 
control of that company vests with the board of directors. 
... 
Having carefully gone through each and every sub-clause of clause 9 (which lists 
the matters to be decided with the nominee director’s consent), we are of the view 
that it means what it says. The various sub-clauses are meant only to protect the 
interest of the acquirer (appellant) and the investment made by it. ... The list of 
matters provided in clauses 9(a) to 9(o) are not in the nature of day to day 
operational control over the business of the target company. So also, they are not 
in the nature of control over either the management or policy decisions of the 
target company. These provisions merely enable the acquirer to oppose a proposal 
and not carry any proposal on its bidding.24 
 
Notwithstanding SAT’s position it is evident that in all strategic matters, the 
investee company’s promoters’ hands are tied. They cannot decide on a business plan 
nor can they appoint even key officials of the company. One interpretation could be 
that the investee company’s board has only to endorse what the investing company 
wishes. Otherwise there will be a stalemate.  While the SAT did not deem the powers 
to be veto powers, there is every possibility of the veto powers being interpreted as 
amounting to some sort of control in this regard.  It is relevant to refer in this context 
to the European Commission’s competition policy which states that: 
Joint control exists where two or more undertakings or persons have the 
possibility of exercising decisive influence over another undertaking. Decisive 
influence in this sense normally means the power to block actions which 
determine the strategic commercial behaviour of an undertaking. Unlike sole 
control, which confers the power upon a specific shareholder to determine the 
strategic decisions in an undertaking, joint control is characterized by the 
possibility of a deadlock situation resulting from the power of two or more parent 
companies to reject proposed strategic decisions. It follows, therefore, that these 
shareholders must reach a common understanding in determining the commercial 
policy of the joint venture (emphasis added).25 
Van Bael & Bellis, a Brussels-based leading law firm concurs by saying that  
Generally, where the support of the minority shareholder is needed to make 
decisions concerning the undertaking’s business plan and annual budget and to 
appoint management, such a minority shareholder will be considered to jointly 
control the undertaking, regardless of the fact that it may be significantly less 
represented on the board than the majority shareholder and may have no ability to 
influence other less important decisions of the undertaking.26   
It would also be relevant to refer to the SEBI Takeover Regulations Advisory 
Committee which noted that  
... given the case-specific nature of “control” as a concept, the Committee decided 
to refrain from stipulating whether the power to say ”no” would constitute 
“control” for purposes of the Takeover Regulations. Whether a person has 
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acquired control by virtue of affirmative rights would therefore have to be 
discerned from the facts and circumstances surrounding each case. 
The Committee’s recommendation that  
... the definition of “control” be modified to include “ability” in addition to “right” 
to appoint majority of the directors or to control the management or policy 
decisions would constitute control (sic).27 
expands the ambit of control from mere majority in the board.  There is thus not only 
going to be a high degree of subjective element in determining control and the 
objectivity of the authorities is going to be crucial in ascertaining the same but one 
can expect considerable litigation by the interested parties. 
From the foregoing it becomes obvious that the CFP’s emphasis on the right to 
appoint majority directors as the final indicator of control is based on inadequate 
appreciation of corporate law and practices and is bound to help foreign investors in 
exercising greater control than what is intended to be permitted to them. This indeed 
raises doubts about the efficacy of the sectoral caps, especially high stakes like 74% 
in case of telecommunications, themselves.  Interestingly, some of the Indian partners 
of the large telecom companies are multinational in nature and it would be difficult to 
visualise where their interests lie and where does control lie.   
Need for Clarity in Objectives 
This brings us to the fundamental question.  What is the objective of allowing FDI 
in ‘sensitive’ areas?  Is it to attract foreign capital and technology so that the sectors 
would grow fast and efficiently?  If this is the case, then sectoral limits on FDI could 
obviously act as major deterrent for foreign investors.   The second is about the 
imposition of sectoral caps.  Is it to help retain control in the hands of Indians so that 
national interests and sensitivities could be well protected? Is it to enable domestic 
entrepreneurs gain strength?   Or, is it to prevent higher degree of foreign ownership 
per se and thus prevent large outflows in the form of dividends?  If the latter alone is 
the issue, there is no logic in allowing FDI in these areas in the first place. Attracting 
larger volumes of FDI cannot at all be a consideration for opening up such sectors.28  
Since retaining some control in Indian hands appears to be the main objective, the 
following points may be in order.  Given the fact that there is no explicit restriction on 
the extent of foreign control at the entry point whenever entry through the automatic 
route is allowed, as complete reliance is placed on percentage shares, the subsequent 
effort at limiting control through monitoring indirect foreign equity would be of no 
use.  Even in the case of defence sector, for which the government’s approval is 
mandatory, the CFP, while elaborating on the indirect foreign equity, only says that 
the present limit of 26% is subject to the condition inter alia that, “(T)he management 
of the applicant company/partnership should be in Indian hands with majority 
representation on the Board as well as the Chief Executives of the 
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company/partnership firm being resident Indians”, thus relying on the nationality of 
the directors and their majority in the board.  Obviously, simply looking at the 
nationality of the directors one is likely to misjudge the character of a company’s 
board of directors and oblivious to the constraints under which they would be 
working. 
It should also be underlined that in cases where the foreign contribution to the risk 
capital is low at 26% and the remaining has to be mobilised by the Indian partner 
himself, he would opt for foreign collaboration mainly to derive substantial 
advantages in terms of technology, goodwill, etc.  This places him at a disadvantage 
in negotiating with the foreign partner and thus he is more likely to accede control 
over operations and strategy to the foreign investor.  The disproportionate control of 
the boards conceded to the foreign partners in the insurance JVS clearly points out to 
this. On the other hand, a serious foreign investor would try to keep control by all 
means as the joint venture came into being mainly because of the restrictive FDI 
regime in the absence of which he would most probably have opted for a wholly 
owned venture.  The takeover by the foreign partner of many JVs over the years is a 
clearly points to this possibility.  His other main reason for entering into JV could be 
to take advantage of the partner’s knowledge of local market conditions, network and 
political connections which are important but not always critical to the venture.  An 
additional point that needs to be kept in mind is that the Indian partner need not 
always act in national interest or believe in sectoral sensitivities.  Commercial 
interests may prevail over national and social obligations.  It is always going to be 
difficult to achieve the twin objectives of attracting FDI along with the attendant 
benefits of technology while simultaneously retaining control in Indian hands.  It 
should be underlined that the DIPP discussion paper “Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) in Defence Sector” argues for increasing the foreign stake in equity to 74% 
from 26% as “higher FDI limit would also provide a significant incentive for transfer 
of know-how/technology to the country”.29  Obviously, in such a situation only a 
stringent obligation, if at all, can protect national interest, especially because the 
Indian party cannot have majority on the board, he would also not have the capacity to 
prevent most decisions at the annual meetings.  Alternatively, the government should 
think of holding ‘golden shares’ in such ventures. 
 
Summing Up 
The issue of indirect control came into focus because of the restriction on the extent 
of foreign equity imposed for certain sectors. The Consolidated FDI Policy of 2010 places 
emphasis on majority ownership and right to appoint majority directors for defining a 
domestic company.  There is evidence to show that the sectoral caps, if these are aimed at 
restricting the extent of control yielded by foreign investors as a means of protecting 
national interest/objectives, can be defeated in practice through shareholder 
agreements/rights written into AoA as has been seen in case of the insurance sector. It is 
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an acknowledged fact that relative strengths of the partners determines the extent of 
control in joint ventures and the dominant partner has many avenues to impose his will.   
Even if a foreign entity cannot own a majority of a joint venture, it may be able to 
legally obtain operational control through other means.  One may surround the joint 
venture with contractual obligations to the foreign venturer.  For example, if the joint 
venture is to assemble components manufactured in the United States, the U.S. 
investor retains significant control over the joint venture regardless of how many 
shares the investor owns or how many directors it can name to the board because it 
controls the supply of components.  Similarly, a U.S. investor can exercise control 
through supply contracts, marketing agreements, management contracts, and veto 
power in the joint venture agreements. (emphasis added)30 
 
In policy-induced JVs, the foreign partner is more likely to deploy all possible means 
to run the enterprise as if it was a wholly-owned one by reducing the local one to a 
sleeping partner.  Even going by the European Commission’s interpretation of the rights 
secured by minority shareholders through AoA or shareholder agreements the situation 
can at best be joint control and at worst be sole control by the foreign minority 
shareholders given the dependence of domestic partners.  Given such a scenario, the 
monitoring of indirect FDI envisaged by the CFP, would hardly make a difference to the 
extent of control enjoyed by the foreign investor. 
At the other extreme, when foreign equity up to 74% is allowed considerable 
control has already been yielded. Given the dependence of local partner on the foreign 
partner for critical inputs, it is a moot point to what extent the former will be able to 
influence the venture’s operation by taking advantage of the 26% shareholding.  In the 
absence of express conditions that the 26% should be held by a single Indian entity or 
entities having binding common interests even this expected protection would prove 
illusory. 31 This is irrespective of the fact whether the local partner, especially if he 
has substantial international businesses, would give priority to national interests. 
Given the manner in which funds are being raised and group operations are (proposed 
to be) being organised by some Indian business groups, but for their original 
nationality, there is nothing to suggest that national interest could be more important 
for them than their own personal business interests.   
It is evident that India has not learnt much from her own FERA dilution 
experience as also from the overwhelming international evidence.  As long as foreign 
investment up to a certain level is allowed under the automatic route, the foreign 
investor can opt for binding clauses which can give him absolute control.  It does not 
matter whether the indirect investment route which he wishes to exploit to increase 
control/shareholding and which the government aims to monitor has similar clauses or 
not.  Any scrutiny at the second level thus becomes redundant as far as control by the 
foreign investor is concerned. Control is the crux of the matter and it cannot be 
measured by percentages like 26 or 49 and proportion of directors in the board.  The 
minimum that should be done is to disallow veto powers, withdraw automatic route 
facility for such sectors and follow a case-by-case approach.  The government should 
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also consider holding golden shares in all companies operating in sectors considered 
highly sensitive from national security and public health point of view.  Before 
proceeding further with the regulation of indirect foreign equity, there is obviously a 
need for the government to specify the objectives in placing caps in each sector and 
also to study how the present caps are working in practice at all stages.  The CFP 
should elaborate on this in its next revision.  
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